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ARTICLE

The Substantive Politics of Formal Corporate
Power
MARTHA

T. MCCLUSKEYt

I. CRITIQUING THE FORM VERSUS SUBSTANCE DILEMMA

A. Changing the Question of CorporatePower
In Planet of the APs, Marc Galanter gives a fascinating,
important picture of the increasingly privileged legal
position of artificial persons-namely corporations-in the
U.S. legal system.1 Corporations "occupy more of the legal
realm"' 2 compared to natural persons, they use a greater
quantity and percentage of legal services, 3 more prestigious
and expensive lawyers 4 at lower cost, 5 and they use those

t William J. Magavern Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, State University
of New York at Buffalo. E-mail: mcclusk@buffalo.edu. Thanks to the
participants and organizers of the University at Buffalo Law School 2005 James
McCormick Mitchell Lecture for the event that inspired this article. Thanks
also to participants in the Buffalo Law School Faculty Workshop for their
excellent comments and conversation on a draft presentation.
1. Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and its
Users, 53 BUFF. L. REv. 1369 (2006).
2. Id. at 1387.
3. Id. at 1376-86.
4. Id. at 1380-81.
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services more effectively to win more frequently as both6
plaintiffs and defendants when opposing individuals.
Furthermore, corporations more effectively mobilize to
change the legal system 7 through lobbying,8 other forms of
political activism, 9 repeat litigation, 10 and through
formation of their own "public interest" advocacy firms."
12
What might a perspective from critical legal analysis
add to this picture of corporate legal power? Robert Gordon
explains that critical legal theories challenge the core
argument of most legal thought: that nothing important can
change.13 "The dominant message of orthodox legal training
was then and still is today that a basically unalterable
value consensus, a basically unchangeable system of
economic and political realities, a basically frozen system of
legal understandings and institutions, fix rigid outer
boundaries to thinkable social change."' 4 For example, one
way that mainstream legal scholarship helps make
pervasive injustice appear intractable is by attributing it to
generally benign form, not harmful function.
Consistent
with
that
orthodox
strategy,
the
commentary on Galanter's presentation (reprinted in this
issue) discusses his picture of corporate power mostly as a
problem of formal structure. That discussion presumes that
because large corporations
are complex, legalistic
organizations capable of developing and controlling
substantial economic and legal resources, they naturally
5. Id. at 1392 (noting that commercial artificial persons enjoy tax subsidies
for their expenditures on legal services).
6. See id. at 1389-91.
7. See id. at 1398.
8. Id. at 1387, 1399.
9. Id. at 1399.
10. Id. at 1387-89.
11. Id. at 1398.
12. See generally MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987);
LEFT LEGALISM / LEFT CRITIQUE (Wendy Brown and Janet Halley eds., 2002);
THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
See also infra notes 23, 50-51 and accompanying text (mentioning several
branches of this critical legal scholarship).

13. Robert W. Gordon, Some Critical Theories of Law and Their Critics, in
THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, supra note 12, at 641.
14. Id. at 643.
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and necessarily hold sway in a legal system dependent on
costly, specialized expertise in making, applying, and
interpreting formal rules. Critical legal analysis, in
contrast, often starts by suspecting that unequal power may
result from contingent and contested substantive policy
choices linked to problematic values and interests. A critical
view would aim to explore the politics masked and
mystified by discussing the substantive inequality between
natural and artificial persons as the product of a beneficial,
essentially unalterable, corporate form in a formally
neutral legal and economic system.
Galanter opens his article by noting that corporations
are a tool of great social good, but that, like Frankenstein,
they have also become a force of their own with more
problematic consequences. 15 By framing the problem this
way, Galanter implicitly invites the question whether
corporations are, in the end, good or bad considering their
indirect and often unacknowledged substantive effects on
the legal system. In his commentary on Galanter's article,
David Westbrook affirms what he perceives to be an
inevitably ambivalent answer to this question. 16 Galanter's
analogy to Frankenstein suggests that corporate dominance
in the legal system is an unintended byproduct of a creation
originally designed to serve important, uncontroversial
public ideals. If corporations are merely technical
instruments of our otherwise good socioeconomic system-a
tool effectively crafted to accomplish a task-then it would
be logically absurd, or even quaintly or dangerously
antisocial, to conclude that corporate power is wrong. 17 This
view, as Westbrook approvingly suggests, reduces our

15. See Galanter, supra note 1, at 1370-71; see also Katie J. Thoennes,
Comment, Frankenstein Incorporated: The Rise of Corporate Power and
Personhood in the United States, 28 HAMLINE L. REV. 203, 204-05 (2005)

(arguing that, like Frankenstein, the artifically created corporation has turned
into a destructive monster).
16. David A. Westbrook, Commentary, Galanter v. Weber, 53 BUFF. L. REV.
1445, 1445 (2006).

17. See Galanter, supra note 1, at 1370 (stating that corporations "have
proved a tool for complex and coordinated action"); Westbrook, supra note 16, at
1449 (stating that "Corporations and other APs are designed to accomplish
some task, and much of the time they do. This would seem to make
corporations, in general, good.").
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concerns about corporate power simply to tragic or comic
18
discomfort with the fact that modern life is so good.
But a critical approach would ask which particular
corporate forms, with which substantive privileges, are
good or bad for which natural persons and for what
substantive systems of social and political power. This
reframing of the question invites consideration of an answer
that has been offered by progressive political movements
around the world yet muffled in mainstream U.S. politics
and scholarship. This answer warns that corporate power,
both in and out of the courts, is not a tragic side effect of a
benign,
inevitable
modernity
where
bureaucratic
organizations make frustration and impersonal formality
the price of large-scale growth and enlightenment. Instead,
this perspective views contemporary corporate power as the
devised, unjust effect of a political economy that is
operating to reestablish and maintain many of the
conditions and premises of colonialism and premodern
feudalism for much of the world's people. 19
By re-framing the question, critical legal analysis can
challenge the presumption that the corporation is both
natural and apolitical. Asking whether corporations are
"good" or "bad" serves to naturalize the "artificial person"
and the particular substantive shape that its formal
personhood now assumes. By posing the question as how
"good" or "bad" corporations "are," we reify or even deify
APs as if their effects stem from some inherent, internal
18. See Westbrook, supra note 16, at 1445, 1449, 1451.
19. See, e.g., WILLIAM K. TABB, UNEQUAL PARTNERS: A PRIMER ON
GLOBALIZATION 85-92 (2002) (discussing comparisons between colonialism and
current corporate globalization, and the dependence of current "free market"
programs on elite, antidemocratic rule); Chantal Thomas, Causes of Inequality
in the International Economic Order: Critical Race Theory and Postcolonial
Development, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 6-9 (1999) (explaining how
the international "free market" economy depends on illiberal colonial racial
ideology and regimes); Chantal Thomas, Globalizationand the Reproduction of
Hierarchy, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1451 (2000) (explaining how "free-market"
economic policies can reinforce existing structural inequalities based on race
and class); John A. Powell & S.P. Udayakumar, Race, Poverty and
Globalization, May/June
2000, http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/
econl0l/globalizationO72000.html.pf (concluding that if the current process of
capital-led globalism continues, "we are likely to permanently re-inscribe a
subordinated, life-threatening status for people of color all over the globe and
rationalize it with an invisible hand."). See also infra pp. 1473-84 (discussing
Roy and the East India company).
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character waiting to be discovered. Furthermore, asking
whether this personified legal fiction is "good" or "bad"
frames any substantive harm primarily as a problem of
individual (and fictional) morality divorced from serious
politics,20 a matter of private obscure intentions-ill will or
than unjust public power institutionalized
goodwill-rather
21
law.
in
If we instead aim to evaluate what different corporate
forms and what different substantive powers are better or
worse for whom, we keep in the foreground the fact that
corporations are artificial, however real their privileges and
powers under current law. This question assumes that
corporations as we know them are not a fixed essence given
to us by the natural or supernatural order, but are very
human creations of particular, historically contingent,
contested social and political systems. As legal creations
dependent on human choices, the privileges and powers
(good or bad) of corporations remain subject to legal change
and challenge.
B. Changing the Conflict From Form to Substance
In his historical commentary on Galanter's study,
political scientist Gerald Berk explains that critiques of
corporations' naturalized status have a long history and
vibrant present. 22 But a critical re-framing of the question
of corporate power highlights an additional perspective in
the background of Berk's account. Some (but not all)
versions of critical legal analysis aim not just to
denaturalize substantive power, but to repoliticize formal
law.23 By asking what different substantive corporate

20. See Kendall Thomas, Racial Justice: Moral or Political?, in LOOKING
BACK AT LAW'S CENTURY 78, 81 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002).

21. This is not to deny the political and intellectual importance of exploring
how particular corporate legal rules shape individual moral behavior and social
values. See generally LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY:
AMERICA'S NEWEST EXPORT (2001) (analyzing recent corporate scandals as
examples of how corporate law constrains and skews managers' moral
judgments).
22. Gerald Berk, CorporatePower and its Discontents, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 1419
(2006).
23. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 18701960, at 172 (1992) (arguing that there has not been enough emphasis on the
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powers are better or worse, and for whom, this politicized
critical approach foregrounds not just the formal law
behind corporate "personhood," but also the substantive
distributivepolitics behind formal law.
Berk argues that corporations' legal power cannot be
neatly attributed to the legal advantages of their
artificiality (as modern, complex, impersonal organizations)
compared to their opponents' naturalness (as human
individuals embedded in traditional personal relationships). 24 Berk's history shows how legal theory has
constructed corporations as natural, and that this
naturalized status may be a source of power not only for
business entities, but also for opposing interests-which
the form of sophisticated large
can also take
25
organizations.
That account implies that the problem of corporate
power poses a dilemma not so much about substantive
power as about legal form and about formal political
principles. 26 One approach to mitigating corporate power
aims to make it more natural, by duplicating the
corporation in a pluralist system of other groups organized
to promote particular interests (e.g., unions or consumers
associations) that can naturally check the power of
organized business in state and market. 27 Or, an
alternative approach aims to mitigate corporate power by
making it less natural, by stripping artificial privileges from
corporations and instead cultivating public virtue capable of
moderating private power. 28 By the mid-twentieth century,
the "naturalized" vision of corporations as reified private

substantive political commitment of some strands of legal realism); Dalia Tsuk,
The New Deal Origins of American Legal Pluralism, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 189,
228 n.192 (2001) (discussing a division in legal realism between those who
turned to empirical social science analysis to make law more political and those
who sought to use empirical social science analysis to make law less political).
24. See Berk, supranote 22, at 1419.
25. See id. at 1420-22.
26. See id. at 1423-24 (contrasting the republican theory versus the pluralist
theory of how to control corporate power).
27. Id. at 1424-25 (discussing critical reifiers and their links to interest
group pluralism).
28. Id. at 1423-24 (discussing critical denaturalizers and their links to
republican political philosophy).
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beings had become widely accepted, 29 although some
concerned about corporate power continued to doubt that
30
countervailing groups could adequately solve the problem.
Berk concludes by presenting the renewed contemporary interest in critiquing the reified, natural status of
corporations as yet another round in an age-old debate
than an
where corporate power is a persistent puzzle rather
31
solutions.
legal
to
susceptible
injustice
urgent
Critical legal historian Dalia Tsuk adds to this picture
by complicating the history of the early twentieth-century
politics of corporate naturalization. 32 In her analysis, the
pluralist ideal of reified corporations balanced by other
large organizations was part of broader ideological efforts to
imagine that sociopolitical power differences are free from
early
inequalities. 33 Leading
structural
systematic,
to
just
not
worked
naturalizers
corporate
twentieth-century
power
corporate
that
to
deny
but
power,
mitigate corporate
raises questions of class and caste.3 4 Pluralist political
theorists, like John Dewey and Harold Laski, promoted a
democratic state constituted by diverse, sovereign, and
relatively equal collective entities not only as a moderate
conservative
to late nineteenth-century
alternative
individualism, but also to socialist claims that society is
structured by pervasive class conflict. 35 Pluralist visions
tended not only to reify the power of organized groups, but
also to construct the relevant groupings of society as freely
chosen, non-coercive associations involving only a narrow
slice of their participants' lives. 36 From this pluralist
perspective, corporate shareholders operated as a broad,
diverse, fluid group of individuals sharing a particular,

29. Id. at 1425-26.
30. See id.
31. Id. at 1426 (stating that "the debate rages on").
32. See Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive
CorporateLaw, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861 (2003).
33. See id. at 1865-68.
34. Id. at 1868 (giving the example of Adolf A. Berle, Jr., a leading corporate
law scholar).
35. See id. at 1875-78.
36. See id. at 1907.
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uniform economic interest unrelated to social and political
37
goals.
These pluralist ideas helped construct egalitarian and
cooperative relations between workers and capital owners
mostly as a matter of form. This vision imagined that power
imbalances would naturally ease once workers could
organize in legally recognized and reified labor organizations that could participate as naturalized equals in state
and market against corporations. 38 To the contrary, labor
historians have shown that an array of substantive laws
and institutions produced a system of unequal bargaining
power skewed to privilege elite capital owners and penalize
labor. 39 By the end of the century, this substantive scheme
had even worked to undo workers' power of formal
organization, leaving a substantial majority of workers
without effective access to unions. 40 Tsuk shows how the

37. Id. at 1866 (discussing pluralists' understanding of groups as "neutral,
voluntary and changing"); id. at 1898 (discussing the ideas of legal scholar
Eugene Rostow).
38. Id. at 1866-67.
39. See James B. Atleson, Reflections on Labor, Power and Society, 44 MD. L.
REV. 841 (1985) (explaining how changes in corporate organization since the
1950s, such as greater international capital mobility and greater concentration,
have worked to give labor less bargaining power in relation to employers); Tsuk,
supra note 32, at 1867; Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial
Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the New
Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 622-36 (1992)
(explaining that pluralist ideals of the workplace as a mini-democracy insulated
from systemic power inequalities shaped interpretations of collective bargaining
laws in ways that disadvantaged workers). Tsuk notes that various subgroups,
such as African American workers, were also disempowered through this
understanding of workers' power as a simple matter of formal organization of
homogenous economic interests rather than as a complex matter of challenging
pervasive systems in which economic inequality is deeply intertwined with
social and political inequality. Tsuk, supra note 32, at 1867 n.24 (citing Daniel
R. Ernst, Common Laborers?Industrial Pluralists,Legal Realists, and the Law
of Industrial Disputes, 1915-1943, 11 LAW & HIST. REV. 59, 82-83, 99-100
(2003)).
40. See generally MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN

THE UNITED STATES (1987); James B. Atleson, Commentary, Law and Union
Power: Thoughts on the United States and Canada, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 463 (1994)
(summarizing the data on declining unionization and analyzing the legal
impediments to effective unionization as a problem interrelated with unions'
unequal political power). See also Van Wezel Stone, supra note 39, at 578-79
(giving data on the decline in unionization, especially during the 1980s); id. at
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ideological denial of class and caste by pluralist corporate
reifiers helped construct substantive corporate law as an
apolitical and technical tool for balancing the interests of
owners and managers, divorced from any broader
substantive questions of power
over workers, communities,
41
consumers, state, or family.
Taking seriously the possibility that corporate power
can be intertwined with systematic and pervasive
inequalities, critical analysis expands the debate beyond a
seemingly intractable dilemma about forms and formal
principles-whether corporations should be artificial or
naturalized, aggregated or individualized, controlled by
state regulation or market competition, softened by
pluralist diversity or republican consensus. If the basic
structures of law and society normally operate to
subordinate many for the benefit of a few, then the formal
organization of our socioeconomic system might not only be
artificial (humanly constructed), but malign (destructive of
purported widely-held social values). This perspective
suggests that the tough trade-offs facing those who would
resist corporate power can act as double binds, supported
both by legal artifice and material power.
Corporations may sometimes seem to have the power to
say to many people in the world: give us your money or your
life. 42 The global corporate-dominated economy may seem to
demand, for instance, that if you want to keep the job you
depend on for income, you must give up the government
regulations, services and benefits that protect your health,
safety, environment, and leisure on and off that job. 43 Or, it
583-84 (explaining the weak bargaining power of unions due to their legal
disadvantages as a reason for workers' negative attitudes toward unions).
41. Tsuk, supra note 32, at 1867-68; see also Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to
Individualism:Berle and Means and 20th-Century American Legal Thought, 30
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 179 (2005) (showing how legal scholarship has
reinterpreted the foundational analysis of corporations by Adolf A. Berle, Jr.,
and Gardiner C. Means to erase their central concern with corporate power).
42. For discussions challenging easy distinctions between "voluntary"
market exchanges and coercive force, see Arthur Leff, Economic Analysis of
Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 480 (1974) and

Robert L. Hale, Force and the State: A Comparisonof "Political"and "Economic"
Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 149 (1935).

43. See

Martha

T.

McCluskey,

Efficiency

and Social

Citizenship:

Challenging the NeoliberalAttack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 805-06

(2003) [hereinafter McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship] (explaining
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might seem to demand that you choose between giving up
much of your monthly income for skyrocketing unregulated
pharmaceutical prices, or giving up the life-sustaining
medication along with the research and development
necessary to produce new life-sustaining drugs. 44 Or, it
might demand that you choose between reducing your
spending on basic social needs like health insurance, good
education, retirement security, or infrastructure or
sacrificing the investment capital, credit ratings and loans
necessary to 45float your sinking businesses, governments,
and families.
Such choices are particularly painful because, in the
contemporary world of global corporate power, money (in a
dominant currency) tends to be necessary but increasingly
insufficient to secure most people's jobs, health, environment, leisure, community, personal freedom, and dignity.
Indeed, the demand made to much of the world's population
often seems to be more accurately stated as: give us your
money and your life. Dig yourself further into debt, danger,
get a
and desperation in pursuit of low wages 46-and
and criticizing how neoliberal ideology and policy creates a double bind that
makes social spending cuts and employment benefits necessary but impossible
for preserving jobs); Martha T. McCluskey, Subsidized Lives and the Ideology of
Efficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL'Y & LAW 115, 133-35 (2000) [hereinafter
McCluskey, Subsidized Lives] (discussing how neoliberal structural adjustment
policies abroad and economic "growth" policies in the U.S. have induced cuts in
social services, wages, and reduced leisure).
44. See, e.g., Editorial, A Shortsighted Path to Cheaper Drugs: Drug
Reimportation Will Curtail Research, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 21, 2004, at
34A (arguing that importing cheaper drugs from countries with price regulation
will stifle innovation by the American pharmaceutical industry, which is
"saving lives left and right"). For a critique of the argument that drug
companies use their high U.S. profits to maximize development of innovative,
life-saving drugs, see Katharine Greider, Offering hope-at a price, THE NATION,
June 9, 2003, at 26.
45. See, e.g., ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE Two-INCOME
TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE (2003)

(analyzing data on the dramatic rise in U.S. bankruptcies as a problem of
impossible choices between costly necessities and costly credit for families
relying on two full time incomes to maintain middle class status).
46. For discussion some of the problems facing workers in a global economy
structured to encourage low-wage work, see generally HARD LABOR: WOMEN AND
WORK IN THE POST-WELFARE ERA (Joel F. Handler & Lucie White eds., 1999) and
LABORING BELOW THE LINE: THE NEW ETHNOGRAPHY OF POVERTY, LoW-WAGE
WORK, AND SURVIVAL IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Frank Munger ed., 2002). See

also Isabel Wilkerson, Angela Whittaker's Climb, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2005, at

2006]

FORMAL CORPORATE POWER

1463

society more dependent on assuring wealthy investors that
their welfare and warfare comes before your wages, job,
long-term economic and political
security, health, family,
47
environment, and freedom.
But corporations require human guns (literally and
48
figuratively) to extend and enforce these bitter choices and politically organized human hands and minds can use
human laws to insist on better choices. It is not the natural,
neutral, or random forces of modern law or modern
markets, but rather it is systematic political and moral
actions (though not necessarily conscious or coordinated) by
self-interested human beings that offer and rationalize
these bad choices.

Al, A23 (reporting experience of woman who made herculean efforts to work
and study her way off welfare, only to land a high-stress, low-wage job as a
nurse that leaves her little time to spend with her family and little money for
basic needs).
47. On the harmful impact of global "development" debt to citizens of both
North and South, developing and developed nations, see SUSAN GEORGE, THE
DEBT BOOMERANG: How THIRD WORLD DEBT HARMS Us ALL (1992); on the bad

choices and "race to the bottom" created by relying on investments from
multinational corporations for global economic development, see James Crotty,
Gerald Epstein, & Patricia Kelly, Multinational corporations in the neo-liberal
regime, in GLOBALIZATION AND PROGRESSIVE ECONOMIC POLICY 117-146 (Dean
Baker et al. eds., 1998); on the similar race to the bottom that drains U.S. local
governments of money for social spending in the interest of job creation at the
same time as it leaves communities with more job insecurity and less effective
development, see generally GREG LEROY, THE GREAT AMERICAN JOBS SCAM:
CORPORATE TAX DODGING AND THE MYTH OF JOB CREATION (2005); on the "global

pincer movement" produced by wealthy international capital owners to the
detriment of most of the world's people, see HANS-PETER MARTIN & HARALD
SCHUMANN, THE GLOBAL TRAP: GLOBALIZATION & THE ASSAULT ON DEMOCRACY &

PROSPERITY 7 (Patrick Camiller trans., 1997).
48. See, e.g., Tentative Settlement of ATCA Human Rights Suits Against
Unocal, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 497 (2005) (describing settlement of lawsuit claiming
that the multinational Unocal violated human rights laws by working with the
military in Burma/Myanmar to use murder and forced labor to advance
corporate interests in building and profiting from a pipeline); Jeremy Scahill,
Blackwater Down, THE NATION, Oct. 10, 2005, at 18 (reporting that major

corporations and their allied political leaders have used private, sometimes
illegally operating, paramilitary forces to engage in vigilante violence or threats
of violence as a way of enhancing corporate power in the reconstruction of New
Orleans); Naomi Klein, The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, THE NATION, May 2,
2005, at 9 (discussing how corporate profiteering is linked to military policy);
PoliticalEconomy of War and Imperialism, in REAL WORLD GLOBALIZATION 189-

219 (Amy Offner et al. eds., 8th ed. 2005) (collecting essays from progressive
economists on the relationship between corporate power and warfare).
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C. Challenging Formalism'sInevitable Substance
This shift in question-from the objective merits of the
corporate form to the particular substantive values and
political interests
and orderings that
the form
incorporates-is a classic example of critical legal method.
Legal liberalism, the broad political philosophy that
includes both liberal and conservative politics, often frames
legal questions as inevitable choices between the competing
values of formal neutrality and substantive individual
fairness. 49 Within this general framework of liberalism,
both political "liberals" and political "conservatives" agree
that a complex, heterogeneous society with conflicting views
of substantive fairness requires prioritizing formal
neutrality in law (and market) to achieve justice.
Furthermore, within this framework there is a common
consensus that the generally preferable formal neutrality
often has harsh effects that sometimes merit substantive
intervention (at least temporarily and at the margins),
especially when there are (temporary or marginal)
substantive breaches or imperfections in the ostensibly
formal neutrality of law or market (like America's history of
racial slavery). In this scheme, political "liberals" tend to
weigh substantive fairness a bit more heavily (based on
judgments of greater substantive flaws in the formally
neutral systems) than "conservatives."
But rather than take sides in this balancing of form and
substance, some critics aim to upend the dichotomy. Some
strands of early twentieth-century legal realism and late
twentieth-century critical legal studies, critical race theory,
and critical legal feminism offer a view of a different choice:
not between competing abstract principles of formalism and
substantive fairness, but between competing particularized,
contingent interests in particular forms with particular
substantive effects (despite the complexity and difficulty of
predicting these effects). 50 This choice inevitably involves
49. See Jeremy Paul, Changing the Subject: Cognitive Theory and the
Teaching of Law, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 987, 987-991 (2002) (summarizing most of
jurisprudence and liberal political theory as a conflict between formalism and
antiformalism, though problematically putting critical feminist and race theory
at the margins of this debate).
50. See, e.g., AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY

(Martha Albertson Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen eds., 1991); Critical
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contested political and moral visions about whose personal
views deserve to be institutionalized as public power. In
this critical view, the democratic rule of law does not
require the tragic (or comic) balancing (or bungling) of
irreconcilable noble ideals, but instead involves responsible,
and responsive, political and legal commitments to
where undemocratic, antisocial values
correcting a system
51
are all too normal.
In an example of this critical deconstruction of the
form/substance divide, feminist jurisprudence has argued
that the problem of persisting gender subordination is not
simply that the law has adopted a formal standard of
equality (treating likes alike) rather than a substantive
standard (ending gender subordination). 52 More pointedly,
feminist theory argues that the law's formal standard of
equality is not in fact formal (and cannot be). 53 Formal
equality necessarily requires a substantive
baseline for
54
measuring sameness and difference.

Race Feminism: A Reader (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997); CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995); CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberl6 Crenshaw
et al. eds., 1995); CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY
(Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002); I FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS
AND OUTLOOKS (Frances E. Olsen ed., 1995). For a discussion of how critical race
theory rejects the false promise of transcendence in formalism without giving
false objectivity to substantive justice, see Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Angela P.
Harris & Francisco Valdes, Subject Unrest, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2435, 2436-38
(2003).
51. In contrast, Marc Kelman offers a less political view of critical legal
studies, asserting that it rejects formalism on the grounds of inevitable, and
inevitably indeterminate, conflicts between principled norms. See KELMAN,
supra note 12, at 12-13.
52. See McCluskey, Subsidized Lives, supra note 43, at 122 (explaining the
equal treatment/special treatment dilemma); Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending
Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1142-44 (1986) (summarizing the equal treatment/special
treatment debate as a problem of formal versus substantive equality).
53. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
221 (1989) (critiquing the choice between substantive and formal equality, or
"sameness" and difference"); McCluskey, Subsidized Lives, supra note 43, at
124-25 (discussing the feminist critique of the formalist/substance debate and
applying it to the efficiency/redistribution debate).
54. See

MARTHA

MINOW, MAKING

ALL THE DIFFERENCE

McCluskey, Subsidized Lives, supra note 43, at 128-29.

50-53

(1990);
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In the traditional equality framework, the principle of
"formal equal treatment" requires employers to be generally
gender blind, treating women in the workplace the same as
men. 55 This formalism avoids the problem that substantive
protections for women's "difference" historically have
disguised and legitimated substantive subordination: for
instance, work restrictions purportedly protecting women's
health or family demands served to reserve higher income
jobs for men. 56 On the other hand, such a formal neutrality
standard will fail to protect women's particular 57
needs and
interests in the workplace (e.g., pregnancy leave).
To address this shortcoming, the mainstream
framework offers the alternative of deviating from formal
neutrality out of concern for substantive fairness. That
approach might allow for "special treatment" of women in
the workplace (gender consciousness) to correct and
accommodate the historical (or biological) assignment to
women of primary responsibility for home and family-so
that women who are pregnant, breastfeeding, or caring for
family members are not disadvantaged in the name of sex
equality. 58 The problem, however, is that particularly
feminized needs and interests will be protected by this
substantive fairness standard only as deviations from a
neutral norm-and
therefore are likely to be stigmatizing
59
and limiting.
Critical feminists rejected liberalism's tragic choice
between formal and substantive gender equality. By
revealing the form as substance, we can see that the choice
is not so much tragic (or comic) as unjust. The apparently
tough dilemma between form and substance stems from its
55. See Finley, supra note 52, at 1142-45.
56. See Kathryn Abrams, The Constitution of Women, 48 ALA. L. REV. 861,
870 (1997) (giving the "mommy track" as an example of the problems with
adopting a substantive standard of equality to address women's "differences");
McCluskey, Subsidized Lives, supra note 33, at 124-25 (discussing the problems
with the substantive equality approach).
57. See Finley, supra note 52, at 1142-48.
58. See id.; JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2000).
59. See Finley, supra note 52, at 1146 (explaining that feminist advocates of
formal sex equality argued that such needs could be better addressed outside
the framework of equality, through legislation granting broad disability
benefits, for instance).
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covert assumption of a substantive standard favoring men:
being treated "equally" means being treated not formally
neutral, but substantively the same as (privileged white)
men; being treated "specially" means being treated by a
being the same as a man
substantive measure that makes 60
the "normal" and normative ideal.
The lesson from this example can be applied to other
debates, like the debate that appears to pit a neutral
corporate form against questions of substantive fairness.
Critical jurisprudence teaches that "formalism" is always
substantive, 61 and that substance is always enforced
through particular forms that mask and legitimatize
substantive values that would be suspect if stated more
overtly. Rather than engage the form versus substance
debate, some critical analysis aims to shift the debate to the
inevitably political and moral questions of which substance,
institutionalized through which forms, are preferable for
which human interests and values.
II. DENATURALIZING AND RE-POLITICIZING CORPORATIONS
A. The Artificial CorporateForm as Natural Economics
The corporate form endows organized capital with
particular status and rights as a legal and market "being"
separate from its human owners. The conventional
scholarly wisdom recognizes that corporations are not truly
''natural," but instead are "legal fictions" dependent on a
sophisticated human-crafted legal system (and complex

60. See MACKINNON, supra note 53, at 221 (both versions of equality hold
women to a substantively male standard); Finley, supra note 52, at 1152-59
(analyzing the assumption of a male norm in traditional formal equality
analysis). Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination
Law, Women's Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal
Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371 (2001) (explaining that neither
formal equality nor targeted protections for pregnancy or family leave have
sufficiently protected many women from employment discrimination due to
their family caregiving).
61. Lucinda M. Finley, Sex-Blind, Separate But Equal, or AntiSubordination? The Uneasy Legacy of Plessy v. Ferguson for Sex and Gender
Discrimination, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1109 (1996) (discussing the
substantive judgments underlying Plessy's formalism).
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market bargaining among competing human interests) 62 for
their creation and sustenance. Nonetheless, mainstream
discussions of corporate power tend to naturalize and
depoliticize the corporate form by presenting it as an
organic outgrowth of the operation of natural laws of
economics in modern, complex society.
In conventional legal economics, this general corporate
structure is deemed "economically efficient"-meaning that
it does not simply enrich particular classes or interests, but
instead maximizes overall societal welfare by reducing the
aggregate costs of providing capital for production without
reducing aggregate benefits. 63 The conventional legal and
economic wisdom presumes that the corporate form rewards
not only wealthy investors, but also society in general by
providing and organizing large pools of capital to drive
large-scale development.
One theory (now less fashionable), roughly stated,
explained that dividing capital ownership from business
operation allowed specialized managers to reduce waste by
expertly, rationally, cooperatively, and hierarchically
coordinating large-scale production. 64 In particular, this
managerial theory explained that the corporate form arose
because technological and economic changes made centralized, integrated planning (by private firms) less costly than
competitive markets. 65 More recently, prevailing theories
have conceptualized the corporate form as a "nexus of
contracts" created through voluntary market bargaining by

62. See Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporationsand the
Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 642-43 (1990).
63. Technically speaking, this is the Kaldor-Hicks version of efficiency,
where aggregate gains outweigh aggregate costs (despite losses for some
individuals). See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 14-17 (5th ed.

1998) (explaining the Kaldor-Hicks version of efficiency).
64. See William H. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation:A
Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 413-14 (1989) (discussing the
managerialist theory of the corporate firm).
65. See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977). For a discussion and critical analysis
of this argument, see WILLIAM G. ROY, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL: THE RISE OF THE
LARGE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION IN AMERICA 7-8 (1997).
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self-interested individuals. 66 Part of this theory involves the
idea that the contractual arrangements that best reduce the
"agency" costs of organized business relationships will be
67
the ones that survive the competitive market process.
These economic theories generally explain the "artificial"
corporate form as a creation of private, voluntary actions
(despite its public legal institutionalization) by actors who
naturally beneficial and apoliticalfollow "natural"-and
68
economics.
of
laws
This prevailing economic theory is basically a tautology,
or a literary device (a metaphor or narrative), not a
hypothesis susceptible to empirical evidence. 69 How do
corporate law scholars know that any given corporate form
indeed fulfills its promise of saving costs overall rather than
escalating or redistributing them? Or, how would legal
theory, informed by prevailing economics, know that
whatever the problematic effects of the contemporary corporate order, it produces societal benefits that outweigh any
harm? The prevailing theory presumes the current
corporate form arises from a generally free market that
generally maximizes societal benefits over costs.
If the corporate form was instead presumed to be the
product (and producer) of legal and political barriersto the
ideal free market, then the particular distribution of risks
and responsibilities that the form now embodies could
instead be logically characterized as inefficient redistribution. In fact, in their foundational book on corporate law,
66. See Bratton, supra note 64 at 415-19 (discussing the basic theory and
summarizing its neoclassical and institutionalist variants); see also Galanter,
supra note 1, at 1371.
67. See Bratton, supra note 64, at 417-18.
68. See id. at 422-23 (explaining the assumptions common to the varying
economic theories of the corporate form). For a critique of how neoclassical
economic ideas in legal theory have more generally presented some "artificial"
governance of the economy as natural, see generally Martha T. McCluskey,
Deconstructing the State/Market Divide: The Rhetoric of Regulation from
Workers' Compensation to the World Trade Organization, in FEMINISM
CONFRONTS HoMo EcONOMIcus:

GENDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY

147

(Martha

Albertson Fineman & Terence Dougherty eds., 2005).
69. See Bratton, supra note 64, at 410 (noting labelling it as such does not
necessarily imply a critique). For discussions of how, in general, neoclassical
economic analysis of law deploys rhetorical strategy disguised as science, see
DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1998) and
McCluskey, supra note 68, at 147.

1470

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means emphasized that corporations are political actors analogous to the state or to the
medieval church in their power to coerce and
control the
economy and undermine competitive markets. 70
Following conventional economic (or moral) logic, the
separation of ownership and control in corporations can be
analyzed as a problem of inefficient moral hazard destructive of overall economic well-being, not an optimal reduction
of agency costs. 71 In the standard theory, moral hazard is
the problem that when otherwise efficient contracts
insulate decisionmakers from the direct costs of their
actions, those decisionmakers will have an incentive to
engage in excessively costly actions-particularly where the
contractual behavior of the decisionmakers cannot be
perfectly enforced. 72 Moral hazard is especially likely to
occur when contracting goes beyond simple exchanges to
involve more complex, long-term, and bureaucratic
relationships between parties with specialized skills or
knowledge. 73 Indeed, the older managerial economic theory
spurred extensive agonized analysis of how law might solve
the problem of moral hazard in the corporation. 74 Moral
70. See Tsuk, supra note 41, at 192 (quoting ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. &
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 352
(1932)); id. at 216-18 (discussing and arguing that legal and economic scholars
have distorted the message of the Berle and Means book).
71. See Galanter, supra note 1, at 1373-74 (noting that economists address
the problem of "agency costs" inherent to the corporate form); Tsuk, supra note
41, at 186-87 (explaining how early twentieth century corporate law scholars
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means argued that the separation of ownership and
control in corporations "severed the tie between self-interest and efficiency").
72. See PAUL MILGRAM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION

&

MANAGEMENT 166-167 (1992) (describing moral hazard as "postcontractual
opportunisism"). For an extensive discussion of the insurance origins and
contemporary economic and legal uses of moral hazard, see generally Tom
Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996). For a
critique of the indeterminacy-and politics--of the concept of moral hazard, see
Martha T. McCluskey, Illusion of Efficiency in Workers' Compensation
"Reform",50 RUTGERS L. REV. 657, 742-50 (1998).
73. See MILGRAM & ROBERTS, supra note 72, at 167 (explaining that in
"simple exchanges of goods with specific, well-understood, observable attributes,
- . . parties
to a transaction can costlessly verify whether the terms of the
transaction are being met").
74. See id. at 181 (discussing the arguments of the path-breaking corporate
law book, ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932)); Tsuk, supra note 32, at 1882
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hazard can be controlled through various regulatory devices
(in private contract, corporate governance, and public
regulatory law), but these mechanisms themselves are
likely to be costly and cumbersome, leading to further costly
bureaucracy producing further opportunities for costly
moral hazard which in turn need further costly control, in a
downward spiraling drain of societal resources. Of course, if
we start by presuming a corporate form that reflects an
efficient market, we can conclude that its particular
arrangements instead incorporate the optimal strategy for
avoiding and correcting moral hazard, happily producing a
corporate form that we can trust to maximize societal
resources.75
If, in any given legal and political context, capital
investors or managers (or the nebulous contractors of the
nexus theory) can increase their personal gain through the
corporate form, then how do we know that this gain reflects
overall benefit to society rather than simply temporary
opportunism at the expense of long-run aggregate societal
well-being? That is, are any possible reduced risks to
corporate transactors from our current corporate system the
result of market incentives for optimally cutting costly
waste? 76 Or are these savings the result of some market
actors taking advantage of protections from normal market
competition to cut corners essential to ensuring good longterm decisions about investment, management, and economic development?
For corporate law (or law in general), there is no
scientific economic measure, or political and moral consensus that can neatly separate a necessary cost in a
transaction (a price) that reflects the optimal performance
of the "efficient" market from the peripheral, unnecessary,
"transaction costs"-like moral hazard-that get in the way
(noting that since Berle and Means published their famous book, "corporate law
scholarship has been obsessed with its exegesis of the potential economic risks
associated with the separation between ownership and control in large business
corporations.").
75. See Tsuk, supra note 41, at 183 (explaining how corporate law scholars
reinterpreted early critiques of the problem of corporate power as discussions of
corporate efficiency, thereby turning the problem into a solution).
76. See Bratton, supra note 64, at 420 (explaining that the nexus of contract
theory rebuts the managerialist concern by presuming a competitive market
producing optimal sharing of risk among parties to the corporate transaction).
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of efficient market transactions. 77 The transaction of capital
investment in railroads, from a neoclassical economic
perspective, (roughly stated) might involve maximizing the
returns to railroad investors and managers while minimizing the costs to railroad operators and users (among
others). But what profits, and what costs, we assign as
legitimate to that capital investment is much more complicated, contested, and contingent than it might first appear.
Imagine, for example, that we want to evaluate a given
substantive system of corporate law. Imagine that this
system's corporate form produces a railroad that brings us
not just more railroad investment and more railroad profits
than it would have otherwise, but also more dead railroad
workers, more fires destroying neighboring property, and
more concentrated political, economic, and military power.
Imagine that this power leveraged by the corporate form, in
turn, allows those investors to further advance their
interests in maximizing railroad investment returns at the
expense of other goals-and even at the expense of long run
economic viability of the railroad business. Are these effects
costly moral hazard-opportunistic gain-seeking external to
efficient transaction? Or are they the necessary price of the
efficient railroad transaction designed to optimally
minimize moral hazard and other costs overall-part of the
facts of life of a nationalized industrial economy that
operates to the long run benefit of society, despite
occasional losers?
Economics provides no objective, apolitical basis for
distinguishing whether any results of any given corporate
structure are costs rather than benefits, or whether any
costs accompanying this corporate structure are the result
of natural market forces or unnatural market failures. Any
calculation of the benefits versus costs of a given corporate
structure requires substantive decisions about distributive
justice: we must decide whose interests, according to whose
measurement, should stand for society's interest; we must
decide which harms law should require society to
systematically recognize and redress, and which harms law
should require society to systematically accept or ignore.

77. See Mayer, supra note 62, at 650 (criticizing the Supreme Court's
similar "operationalism" that begs the question of the purpose of corporations
by defining the purpose to be whatever a given corporation does).
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Moreover, that substantive judgment requires evaluating
not simply whether the general idea of the corporate form is
good or bad, but for whom and for what distributions of
power the form is good, and what particular substantive
rights are good and bad to include in that corporate form. If
the evidence of injustice and harm from the current
configuration of the corporate substance merits only
ambivalent criticism in most scholarship and politics, 78 the
reason may be less that most are persuaded about the
morality and justice of contemporary corporate power 79 and
more that most are dissuaded from questioning the
economic essentialism and determinism that excuses
corporate irresponsibility for widespread social and
economic insecurity and suffering.
B. The Corporationas HistoricalLegal Substance
Critical analysis of corporations has particularly turned
to history to show that the legal idea of the corporation has
been shaped not simply by nature, consensus, or noble
principle, but by deeply contested political interests
embedded in broader structures of power. To counter the
mainstream tendency to take the corporate form for
granted as an essential feature of a modern legal and
economic system, scholars and activists have detailed the
wide variations in its substantive content over time and
across different states and different firms, and they have
examined the particular political and legal contingencies
that ground the current corporate form.8 0
In response to such attempts to denaturalize the
corporation by reducing it to a creature of political history,
tautological economic conviction can reduce any variation or
any phenomenon (including law and politics) to the
necessary, natural consequence of neutral market forces.
Nonetheless, a historical denaturalizing analysis of
78. See Westbrook, supra note 16, at 1445.
79. See MITCHELL, supra note 21, at 3 (arguing that "no thoughtful person"
really believes in the morality or economic soundness of the corporate behavior
produced by the current legal structure, which pressures managers to maximize
short-term stock prices above all else).
80. See, e.g., Roy, supra note 65, at 24-26 (explaining that, during the period
when the corporate form became dominant, incorporation was clustered in a few
industries and in certain firms within those industries).
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corporate substance can challenge such economic fundamentalism at another level. Close historical analysis can
show not only that the corporation's substance is the
contingent and artificial result of quirky, seemingly
irrational and random, decisions. It can also show how
particular corporate substantive choices reflect and produce
systematic, far-reaching, long-lasting, and non-random
structures of power. That power in turn helps to make
corporations (as currently configured) appear more rational,
natural, and necessary, even as their harmful impact
increases.
Economic sociologist William G. Roy explains in his
history of the "corporate revolution," that the question is
not just whether today's particular corporate form was a
rational response by corporate owners, managers, and
others to changing conditions, but what substantive,
structural politics shaped the choices those market actors
faced and the consequences of each choice. 8 ' Roy's historical
account shows how nineteenth-century railroads led the
movement to incorporation not because their successful
economic or societal results proved the corporate form to be
superior, but because the railroad industry's owners and
managers had the power to reshape industrial and financial
markets as well as political and legal structures to help
make the corporate form particularly advantageous for
business interests in subsequent decades.8 2 Roy explains
that larger firms particularly created and adopted the
corporate form during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries because these larger businesses had
more substantive power, not because the corporate form
more suitable for big
was "naturally" or "efficiently"
business or big economies.8 3
If we adopt a critique that examines systemic power as
well as formal law, the problem is not so much that the
current situation of corporate legal power might be
irrational or unnatural, but that its substance might have
been shaped to rationally and "naturally" reproduce and
reinforce a particularly problematic distribution of power.
81. See id. at 14 (comparing a "power theory" of corporate history to the
conventional "efficiency theory.").
82. Id. at 78-114.
83. See id. at 35.
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This critical denaturalizing and re-politicizing history helps
show that the advantages of large corporations in the
current legal and political system are not mainly the result
of its superior substantive merits-the optimal adaptation
to our contemporary environment, like the economic theory
suggests. But neither are the advantages of large
corporations mainly the results of their particularly formal
and formalized nature-the superior ability, as Galanter
explains, of large, impersonal, rule-oriented, repeat players
to negotiate a contemporary large, formal, impersonal, ruleoriented legal system.8 4 Instead, that critical historical
perspective analyzes the current context of corporate power
as the product of some persons' superior substantive power
to institutionalize their shared interests in formal
solidifying, and
mechanisms capable of further shaping,
85
strengthening that substantive power.
1. The Structural Politics of Corporations as Public
Privileges. In his comment on Galanter's analysis of
corporate power, Gerald Berk briefly contrasts today's
naturalized, privatized understanding of corporations with
the public theory of the corporation that originally
prevailed in antebellum United States.86 Elaborating on
this denaturalizing historical comparison is useful not just
to show the artificial nature of the contemporary corporate
form, but also to suggest the connections between its
substantive political nature and structural inequality in
society.
Briefly highlighted, the normal legal power to establish
corporations was once held not by private individuals but
by public legislatures. For much of the first century of
American law, state legislatures typically conferred corporate charters as special privileges for limited periods and
for limited public purposes.8 7 Through the mid-nineteenth
century, U.S. law often treated the corporate charter as a

84. See Galanter, supranote 1, at 1387-89.
85. See ROY, supra note 65, at 13-14.
86. See Berk, supra note 22, at 1420.
87. See Richard L. Grossman & Frank T. Adams, Taking Care of Business:
Citizenship and the Charter of Incorporation, in DEFYING CORPORATIONS,
DEFINING DEMOCRACY: A BOOK OF HISTORY AND STRATEGY 59, 61 (2001);
HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 109-133; Berk, supranote 22, at 1420.
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public benefit and the corporation as a quasi-government
agency, not private property.88 Corporate charters typically
granted a monopoly over some particular enterprise
(typically related to infrastructure development) to a group
of persons who agreed to share its financing and
operation.8 9 Charters were seen as delegations of public
sovereignty, 90 and often included, for example, eminent
domain authority or public funding. 91
As a special government "subsidy," not a private
"entitlement," charters required owners and managers to
satisfy reciprocal public responsibilities. 92 Legislatures, for
example, sometimes established public rights to corporate
property and profits in exchange for issuing a corporate
charter. 93 State legislatures enforced many substantive
conditions on the operation of ongoing corporations. For
example, states sometimes regulated the business's prices
and the investors' rate of return. Furthermore, during this
period American corporations commonly operated under
extensive public oversight, 94 with substantive requirements
enforced through legislative revocation of the charter and

88. See ROY, supra note 65, at 3.
89. See HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 116-30; ROY, supra note 65, at 49.
90. See ROY, supra note 65, at 52.
91. Id. at 51, 62.
92. A similar idea of private reciprocity for government largesse has been
central to contemporary welfare reform debates. Amy Wax claims consensus
norms and even science explain welfare reforms requiring welfare recipients to
take "personal responsibility" to work for others (rather than care for their own
children). See Amy L. Wax, Rethinking Welfare Rights: Reciprocity Norms,
Reactive Attitudes, and the Political Economy of Welfare Reform, 63 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 257 (2000). But Wax's analysis begs the crucial antecedent
question of how we decide what counts as a government benefit and what
counts as a natural right. Whether parental care for children and basic
subsistence or doing business as a corporation count as personal rights or public
privileges is a question of contested politics and morality that has been
answered differently in different social and historical contexts.
93. See Grossman & Adams, supra note 87, at 62 (explaining, for example,
that the New Jersey legislature retained the right to take ownership and
control of corporate property and that Pennsylvania and other states required
corporations to fund the state purchase of utilities).
94. See id. (noting that some legislatures had authority to review corporate
accounting books).
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dissolution of the corporation. 95 Some legislatures bought
shares in their chartered corporations to better maintain
control.96
The story of the shift of the corporation from public
charter to private property can be told as a dispute about
institutional form or formal political principles-for
example, the relative merits of state and market
governance, public versus private investment, legislative
versus judicial control, or the relative merits of republican
or free-market theory. Or it might be told as a political
conflict between competing substantive interests, like
agrarians or small craftspersons versus industrialists.
But this period of public control of corporations involved
not just a substantive conflict over competing economic
interests, or over public versus private control of the
economy, but also a substantive conflict over whether to
publicly control the economy in a way that would help resist
and undo the class structures that grounded colonial
American society. The public control state legislatures
exercised differed from today's structures of corporate
regulation not just in its different institutional form, but in
its potentially different distribution of substantive power.
State legislatures sometimes approached corporate law as
an opportunity to systematically restructure society to
promote more democratic and egalitarian distributions of
economic power.
For example, in conferring the privileges of
incorporation, state legislatures tended to balance corporate
investors' interests against other stakeholding groups, like
labor and local communities, often denying corporate
charters to business enterprises opposed by other interests
or insufficiently focused on the public interest. 97 Sometimes
states required super-majorities of state legislatures or

95. See id. at 64 ("New York State's 1828 corporation law specified that
every charter was subject to alteration or repeal.").
96. Id. at 62.
97. See id. at 62, 65; ROY, supra note 65, at 48 (telling the story of how in
1833 the Pennsylvania legislature denied a coal company a corporate charter on
the ground that it could attract private capital without it (citing Louis HARTZ,
ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT (1968))).
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public referenda to create or renew charters. 98 Some
legislatures structured corporations to ensure equal voting
power for smaller investors; to require favorable treatment
of the poor; or to ensure that investors and managers
retained private individual responsibility for corporate
debts and liabilities. 99
The contemporary view tends to suggest that opposition
to corporate power stems from backward-looking agrarians
unable to accept the reality of modern industrialism, or now
from backward-looking manufacturing workers unable to
accept the reality of post-modern post-industrialism. 100 But
early American opponents of corporate power often
construed it as an anachronistic vestige of unenlightened
medieval and colonial European tradition-a continuation
of a system characterized by medieval guilds and the
imperial East India Company.' 0 ' In that view, the
corporation continued a system of special sovereign
privileges conferred through special entitlements that
organized society into hierarchical groups with broad
powers to control individual lives.10 2 The nineteenth
century anticorporate movement arguably was quite
forward-looking in its predictions that corporations would
facilitate a concentration of power and wealth that would
come to dominate not just business, but electoral politics,
the state, and the media. 10 3 Current opponents of corporate
power have revived and updated this substantive argument
by presenting the history of corporate power, and its
resistance, as a continuing struggle over how far democracy
and human rights should be allowed to encroach on

98. See Grossman & Adams, supra note 87, at 64-65 (giving an example of
New York in the 1840s, Wisconsin, and four other states).
99. See id. at 63.
100. See, e.g., Susan Tiefenbrun, Free Trade and Protests: The Semiotics of
Seattle, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 257 (2000) (characterizing protestors as
"ancients" resisting modernity).
101. See Grossman & Adams, supra note 87, at 61; RoY, supra note 65, at
46; Tsuk, supra note 32, at 1870.
102. See ROY, supra note 65, at 46 (citing William H. Sewell, A Theory of
Structure:Duality,Agency, and Transformation,98 AM. J. Soc. 1 (1992)).
103. See id. at 53. For a discussion of corporate political power today, and its
effect on creating and maintaining a "superclass," see ROBERT PERRUCCI & EARL
WYSONG, THE NEW CLASS SOCIETY 60-64 (1999).
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authoritarian hierarchical traditionalism
10 4
consolidations of class and caste.

and

on

new

2. The Structural Politics of Corporations as Private
Entitlements. By the late nineteenth century, however, as
businesses increasingly adopted the corporate form, a
change in prevailing ideology solidified a competing private
view of corporations. 10 5 In the middle of the century, in
response to populist pressure, states had adopted general
incorporation laws that turned corporate charters
governing public infrastructure projects into administrative
formalities. 106 At the end of the century, this practice of
was expanded to include manufacturgeneral incorporation
07
ing businesses. 1
Again, this change is not just a simple story of growing
preference for private versus public form, or even for
business interests versus their opponents. Neither is it
simply a tragic 0 8 story of the inevitable tradeoffs between
formal equality and substantive equality, where the
populist effort to control big business by popularizing the
corporate form ended up facilitating the rise of corporate
robber barons and today's multinational corporations.
Instead, this story might show the limits of attempts to
control corporate power as a problem of legal form or
narrow substantive economic interests divorced from a
more systemic analysis of state and market class and caste.
Roy explains that the movement to privatize and
generalize the right to incorporate was primarily driven by
corporate opponents, not by business leaders seeking newly
efficient ways of organizing capital. The nineteenth-century
104. See generally DEFYING CORPORATIONS, DEFINING DEMOCRACY: A BOOK OF
HISTORY & STRATEGY, supra note 87; World Social Forum Charter of Principles,

http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/main.php?id-menu=4&cdlanguage=2
(last visited Nov. 20, 2005) (stating their goal of achieving "a new stage in
history" where governments will rest on human rights and international
democratic instutions, rather than the interests of large multinational
corporations). See also, e.g., CorpWatch, http://www.corpwatch.org (last visited
Oct. 15, 2005); What Would Democracy Look Like?, YES!, Winter 2003,
available at http://www.futurenet.org/default. asp?ID=47.
105. See ROY, supra note 65, at 5-6.
106. See id. at 73; Berk, supra note 22, at 1420.
107. See ROY, supranote 65, at 221-58.
108. Or comic, depending on one's politics and morality.
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anticorporate movement split into two factions, an
antistatist movement that argued public control was
inadequate to protect against aristocratic and antidemocratic corporate power; and a more statist branch that
supported greater public accountability and regulation. 0 9
The antistatist faction turned to general incorporation laws
as a solution to the shortcomings of public control of
corporations, on the theory that corporate power would be
better controlled by eliminating special public privileges
than by increased public oversight. 1 10 In contrast, in
France, nineteenth-century anticorporate movements were
more optimistic about public accountability and established
increased (and arguably more successful) regulation of
railroads and other major corporations.1 11
Roy argues that antistatist opponents of corporate
power in the U.S., concerned about state debt from failed
canals and other infrastructure projects, shortsightedly
blamed public investment in economic development, not
private mismanagement of that development under
insufficient public control, for the economic failures of the
mid-nineteenth century.1 12 Antistatist corporate opponents
may have been right in fearing that aristocrats could use
corporate powers to systematically capture the state
against the interests of the rest of society, resulting in widespread economic devastation. 13 But perhaps this history
suggests those corporate opponents were wrong to hope that
by formally protecting the market from the state, or
individuals from groups, they could effectively address that
problem of systematic skewing of state power to control the
economy against the public interest.
Despite its antistatism, this populist anticorporate
movement did not really shift legal power over corporations
from an inegalitarian, captured state to a potentially free
market or from groups to individuals, but instead left in
place a regime of substantive legal privileges for
corporations (e.g., limited liability)-with less countervail109. See RoY, supra note 65, at 72.
110. See id. at 72-74.
111. Id. at 74.
112. See id. at 74-75.
113. See id. at 74 (discussing how the depressions of 1837 and 1857 "sealed
the doom" of the public corporation).
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ing public control. Roy points to three particular areas of
state substantive law that helped construct the current
context of corporate power Examining these substantive
corporate privileges is important not just for showing how
the artificial, contingent nature of the corporate form, but
also for showing how the particular choice of form
facilitated far-reaching, comprehensive substantive changes
in the distribution of systematic power in state and society.
First, limited liability is one of the central features that
currently defines the corporate form. 114 Roy explains that
this supposedly essential right was in fact strongly
contested and varied widely among states throughout the
nineteenth century. 115 Indeed, limited liability was often
criticized through the end of the nineteenth century not just
by agrarian opponents of corporate power, but by wealthy
investors and corporate law scholars concerned that
decreased personal responsibility would lead to corporate
well as to
mismanagement, inefficiency, and instability as
116
an unfair, undemocratic shift in societal power.
By definition, expansive protection from liability
directly redistributes risk between capital owners and
creditors-including consumers, workers, and other
potential tort plaintiffs. That redistribution of risk not only
shifts costs to those outside the capital class, but it also sets
in motion the institutional dynamic that is the focus of
Galanter's study. When "natural persons" challenge
business wrongdoing, they typically sue large institutionswith the attendant structural advantages Galanter and his
commentators discussed-not the natural human beings
who "own"' the business. 117 It is not the inevitable and
inherent superiority of large formal organizations in the
courts, but a particular substantive right of corporations
that grounds the systemic inequality Galanter describes.

114. Id. at 158.
115. Id. at 158-59.
116. See id. at 161; supra text accompanying note 72 (discussing the
corporate form as inefficient moral hazard). For a further discussion of the
moral hazard effects of corporate limited liability, see Reinier H. Kraakman,
CorporateLiability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857,
873-74 (1984).
117. Galanter, supra note 1, at 1394 (noting that defendants in civil
litigation are increasingly corporations sued by natural person plaintiffs).
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Furthermore, the right to limited liability helped put in
motion other indirect institutional and ideological incentive
effects that served to increase corporate (and capital class)
powers. That right helped naturalize the corporation by
providing another incentive to operate it as an individual
legal entity with independent agency and responsibility
instead of as a passive instrument of its associated capital
owners. 118 That idea of corporate individuality later became
reinforced by further legal rules, particularly judicial
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, which in turn
set the stage for new redistributions of legal rights, giving
new economic and political powers to corporations and their
owners. 119
Roy identifies the state establishment of corporate
boards of directors as a second nineteenth-century substantive policy that shaped future corporate power. 20 This
particular, contingent choice of governance structure gave
directors substantive powers greater in the U.S. than in
many other industrialized nations, 121 although many states
maintained sharp restrictions on directors powers through
the early twentieth century. 22 More importantly for the
questions of corporate power that Galanter discusses, this
substantive structure enhanced the power of larger
investors over small investors 123 and facilitated intra-firm
coordination through shared directors. 24 Interlocking
directorates have been an important means for solidifying
and advancing corporate bargaining power and capital class
interests not just in particular markets and industries but
in the state, legal system, academy, and society more
generally. 125

118. See Roy, supra note 65, at 163-64.

119. See generally Mayer, supra note 62.
120. See RoY, supra note 65, at 154-55.
121. See id. at 155.
122. Id. at 156.
123. See id. at 154-55.
124. See id. at 155.
125. Id. at 155; see G. William Domhoff, Power in America: Interlocking
Directorates in the Corporate Community, http://www.sociology.ucsc.edu/
whorulesamerica/power/corporate community.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2005)
(arguing that such social and economic ties mean nonprofits are not a "third
sector" or civil society independent from market and state, but are strongly tied
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Third, Roy analyzes the impact of the late nineteenthcentury decision by a few states (led by New Jersey) to
enact statutes changing the common law rule that
corporations could not hold property in other firms. 126 This
legal right to intercorporate stock ownership, a right not
available to other enterprises, gave investors new legal
power to form large multistate organizations capable of
controlling competition in particular markets127-and
among particular state regulatory systems. 128 Again, this
seemingly technical legal change, with little attention in
even the business press, 129 reinterpreted what once were
combinations in restraint of trade into combinations that
legitimated concentrated commercial power, 130 thereby
potentially producing a systemic change in the distribution
of power between business, labor, and consumers (among
others) in both market and state politics. Large conglomerations now could be achieved through the purchase of
individual stock, which (unlike mergers) more easily
allowed large combinations to evade regulation by states
ownership and foreign
attempting to restrict concentrated
13
control of their markets.
In retrospect this corporate right (and the resulting
power) might seem the inevitably superior outcome of state
experimentation with different approaches, or the result of
rational consensus about the needs of a modern economy.
Roy argues, to the contrary, that most states resisted
adopting the change through the 1920s,1 32 and that it was
strongly condemned for producing inefficient business
structures not just by populists but by some in mainstream

to corporate control); see also They Rule, http:/www.theyrules.net (last visited
Dec. 4, 2005) (database of corporate and nonprofit interconnections).
126. See HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 83; ROY, supranote 65, at 148-49.
127. See ROY, supra note 65, at 150.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 152.
130. Id. at 153; see also HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 83 (noting that this law
was drafted by corporate lawyers seeking to evade antitrust law).
131. See ROY, supra note 65, at 150.

132. See id. at 152 ("It was not until the 1920s that as many as 30 states
had passed similar laws allowing intercorporate stock ownership.").
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corporate law. 133 This change (and resistance to it) reflects
not just a conflict about form-a debate between those who
favored more personal market relationships and those who
preferred a market benefits of big formal organizations.
Instead, it reflects a conflict over whether power within and
without the corporation would be distributed more broadly
or concentrated more narrowly. Roy notes that the right to
establish large conglomerations not only helped concentrate
control among a few large shareholders. 134 More importantly, Roy argues that this new corporate ownership right
changed the distribution of power outside of the corporation
class control over the market and
to facilitate greater upper
state more generally. 135
3. The Structural Politics of the Corporation as
Constitutionally Protected Individual. Corporations owe
their current substantive powers not simply to the evolution
of nineteenth-century state law, but to particular, and
particularly contested, judicial constructions of the federal
Constitution. These legal constitutional legal rights,
shaping the distribution of power between capital owners
and others in society, continue to be developed in ways that
36
expand substantive corporate powers, as Galanter notes.'
In 1819, the Supreme Court used the Constitution's
Contracts Clause to erode state control over corporations by
assigning private property rights to the corporate entity,
thereby opening the door to privatization of the corporate
form' 37-and perhaps partly closing the door to a more
38
democratic and egalitarian approach to higher education.
After the Civil War, the Supreme Court ruled, without
133. Id. at 153-54 (citing comments of legal scholar Theodore Burton in
1911).

134. See id. at 173.
135. See id. at 174.
136. See Galanter, supra note 1, at 1404-05.
137. See Alfred S. Konefsky's discussion of Bd. of Tr. of Dartmouth Coll. v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE
SUPREME COURT 217 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
138. See Peter Kellman, You've Heard of Santa Clara, Now Meet
Dartmouth, in DEFYING CORPORATIONS, DEFINING DEMOcRACY: A BOOK OF
HISTORY & STRATEGY, supra note 87, at 89 (explaining that this case involved an
effort by the state legislature to use Dartmouth's charter to open up public
colleges across the state).
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explanation or precedent, that corporations were "persons"
protected from state regulation by the Equal Protection
Clause. 139 Looking back at the impact of this case, Justice
Hugo Black commented that for the first fifty years after
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, more than fifty
percent of the Supreme Court cases applying that
Amendment involved corporations seeking its protection; in
contrast, less than one-half of one percent involved
40
protection of African Americans from race discrimination. 1
The Court soon extended constitutional due process
protection to corporate property.' 4 ' Those decisions in favor
of corporate constitutional personhood, combined with the
Lochner era doctrine of fundamental economic liberties,
allowed corporations to spend several decades invalidating
a large number of state regulations designed to protect the
interests of labor, consumer, and competitors. 142 In addition, reversing a longstanding doctrine to the contrary, in
1910 the Supreme Court established a corporate right to do
business across state boundaries-which helped give
corporations the political and economic power to "strike" or
"boycott" for43more favorable state regulations in a race to
the bottom.1
These decisions were important not only as particular
instances of courts favoring corporate "artificial persons" at
the expense of the democratic power of "natural persons."
More importantly, these rules have helped to build an
institutional framework that today makes it more difficult
and costly for individual judges, legislatures, or litigants to
regardless of how good their intentions
counter that power,
44
or arguments.

139. Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886); see HORWITZ,
supra note 23, at 66-67 (linking Dartmouth College and Santa Clara).
140. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson 303 U.S. 77 (1938).
141. See Noble v Union River Logging R.R. 147 U.S. 165 (1892), discussed in
Mayer, supra note 62, at 590.
142. See Mayer, supra note 62, at 588-90. Mayer discusses a 1936 Fortune
magazine article praising the 1886 personhood decision for giving corporations
great freedom from state regulation. Id. at 591.
143. See HORWITZ, supranote 23, at 79 n.66.
144. See ROY, supra note 65, at 14-16 (discussing the role of institutions in
the dynamics of corporate power).
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After 1960, the Supreme Court extended many of the
protections of the Bill of Rights to corporations. This timing
was not coincidental but instead was the outcome of a
substantive struggle for re-asserting public and egalitarian
control over the corporation (perhaps driven by the failure
of competing interest groups to fulfill the pluralists' promise
of countervailing power). 145 Legal scholar Carl Mayer
explains this new wave of constitutional rights as strategy
for resisting the development of the late twentieth-century
regulatory regime aimed at protecting consumer, labor,
social, and environmental interests (among others) against
harm from business interests. 146 The Supreme Court ruled
in 1977 that the Fourth Amendment protected corporations
from warrantless regulatory searches. 147 In 1976 and 1980,
the Court interpreted the First Amendment to protect
corporate speech,48 including both commercial speech and
political speech.1
These general rights have been applied to give
corporations specific protection against regulatory attempts
to include participation of others interests; 149 to protection
against disclosure requirements; 50 and to protect a
corporate right to spend money to influence elections. 51 In
addition, expanding Fifth Amendment protections to
include more personal rights, in 1962 the Court gave

145. See supra text accompanying notes 23-38; see also CHARLES NOBLE,
LIBERALISM AT WORK: THE RISE AND FALL OF OSHA 114-19 (1986).

146. See Mayer, supra note 62, at 601-03.
147. See id. at 606-07.
148. See Virgina State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), discussed in Mayer, supra note 62, at 611-13
(changing precedent to decide that advertising is no longer outside the reach of
the first amendment); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980), discussed in Mayer, supra note 62, at 611-13.
149. See Pac. Gas & Electric v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1 (1986)
(holding that corporate rights to freedom of association prohibited state
regulatory strategy that would have given ratepayer advocates access to billing
envelopes).
150. Mayer, supra note 62, at 617-18 (discussing the invalidation of the
SEC's disclosure requirements governing corporate takeovers and stock
offerings).
151. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978),
discussed in Mayer, supra note 62, at 615-16.
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corporations protection against double jeopardy. 152 And in
1980, the D.C. Circuit Court ruled that corporations have
not just property but liberty interests protected under the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause-including the
corporation's
interest in protecting its reputation from
15 3
regulators.
In his article analyzing these corporate Bill of Rights
cases, Carl Mayer argues that their cumulative effect
affords corporations bold new powers to resist regulation.
Moreover, these rulings, which have little clear grounding
in constitutional text, original intent, precedent or widely
accepted structural principles, have helped create a political
and legal context that gives corporations more power to
enhance their economic advantages in the civil litigation
with natural citizens. Speech protections, for instance, may
enhance corporate power to influence jurors' opinions, to
select judges, and to change the substantive provisions that
govern civil litigation to better favor corporate defendants
(through tort reform, for example). Or, for example,
restrictions on government agencies' or citizens groups'
access to corporate information may increase the costs of
gathering evidence for plaintiffs challenging corporate
defendants.
As Justice Rehnquist argued in one dissent, such
decisions in part revive the Lochner tradition 54 by
constitutionalizing the economic interests of capital owners
over competing legitimate social interests. 155 And just as
corporations in the Lochner era appropriated and
undermined the racial justice and human rights protections
in the post-Civil War reconstruction era Constitution,
corporations in the post-Warren Court era appropriated and
undermined the new fundamental rights to personal
152. See Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 142 (1962), discussed in
Mayer, supra note 62, at 619.
153. See Old Dominion Dairy Products, Inc. v. Secretary of Defense, 631
F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir.1980), discussed in Mayer, supra note 62, at 618-19.
154. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 589 (Rehnquist, J.
dissenting).
155. See Mayer, supra note 62, at 612-18 (discussing Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp.); see also TABB, supra note 19 at 246-47 (explaining that the purpose
of international trade policies favoring global corporate power is not "free trade"
but to free capital from democratic social protections that favor workers, the
environment, and human rights).
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freedom and equality that grew out of the mid-twentiethcentury racial justice movement. 156 This development of
expansive corporate constitutional individual rights against
the state does not necessarily flow automatically from a
theory that corporations should be formally treated as
reified legal entities constitutive of the modern state. To the
contrary, leading corporate law scholar Adolf Berle
explained in 1952 that his pluralist vision of corporate
power required that certain Bill of Rights protections be
applied to protect natural persons157 not just against the
state, but also against corporations.
Taking further the reverse position favoring corporate
protection against democratic accountability, the 1990s
arguably marked a new era of fundamental rights for
corporation personhood through the development of a newly
strengthened international governance system working to
protect multinational corporations from government regulations favoring labor, environmental, social welfare and
consumer interests. The World Trade Organization and the
International Monetary Fund, for example, enhance the
freedom and security of the wealthiest corporate financiers
while limiting the power of national and local governments
to enforce socioeconomic policies that advance alternative
interests and values. 158 This new regime has repeated at
the international level the pattern of corporate appropriation and undermining of non-wealthy natural persons' legal
struggles for freedom and equality. The human rights rules

156. Thanks to Athena Mutua for pointing out this connection.
157. Tsuk, supranote 41 at 203 (discussing A. A. Berle, Jr., The Developing
Law of CorporateConcentration,19 U. CHI. L. REV. 639, 643 (1952)).
158. See, e.g., LORI WALLACH & MICHELLE SFORZA, WHOSE TRADE
ORGANIZATION? CORPORATE GLOBALIZATION AND THE EROSION OF DEMOCRACY

(1999) (analyzing the potentially far-reaching impact of international trade
agreements designed to enhance "corporate economic globalization"); Martha
McCluskey, Rhetoric of Risk and the Redistribution of Social Insurance, in
EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY

146, 158-166 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002) (describing these
international institutions as a new social security system for wealthy global
capital owners that is displacing social welfare programs for nonrich persons);
Ute Pieper & Lance Taylor, The Revival of the Liberal Creed: The IMF, the
World Bank, and Inequality in a Globalized Economy, in GLOBALIZATION AND
PROGRESSIVE ECONOMIC POLICY, supra note 47, at 37 (stating that "Half the
people and two-thirds of the countries in the world lack full control over their
own economic policy" because of regulation by the IMF and World Bank).
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enshrined in the international covenants and national
constitutions that grew from post-World War II anticolonial
and antifascist movements arguably have been drained of
much of their substantive power as corporations have
instead mobilized international law on behalf of upper class
elites resisting democratic control.
4. The Structural Politics of State Farm's New
Constitutional CorporateProtections. Finally, in the twentyfirst century, the U.S. Supreme Court has continued to
expand substantive constitutional protection of corporate
personhood and corporate power against state regulation.
In 2003, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company v. Campbell159 invoked an insurance company's
right to constitutional substantive and procedural due
process to strike down a state court decision awarding
punitive damages for the insurer's bad faith refusal to
settle. This case is particularly revealing for the light it
sheds on the structural and theoretical underpinnings of
the growth of systematic corporate power over natural
persons in civil litigation.
Expanding the holding in another recent case involving
punitive damages against a corporation, 160 State Farm
defied the post-Lochner principle that substantive due
process should protect basic, personal human freedoms, but
not property interests, from majority decisions about
society's welfare. Punitive damages are uncommon in civil
litigation against corporations, 16 1 but this case nonetheless
has broad significance because of how it personifies the
"artificial" business defendant-and how it naturalizes that
defendant's disproportionate power to evade tort liability.

159. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
160. See BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); State Farm,
538 U.S. at 438 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that this case takes a less
moderate approach than Gore to limiting punitive damages).
161. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive
Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 633-34 (1997) (finding that punitive damages
are awarded in about three percent of all jury trials and in about six percent of
jury trials in which plaintiffs prevailed); see also Stephen C. Yeazell, Punitive

Damages, Descriptive Statistics, and the Economy of Civil Litigation, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2025, 2037-38 (2004) (explaining that State Farm is a rare case
not only because it awarded punitive damages, but because the punitive
damages were so much greater than the compensatory damages awarded).
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Why did the defendant insurance company deserve this
new federal constitutional protection from the risks of
substantial economic loss in state civil courts-on top of
whatever "normal" advantages such large "artificial
persons" otherwise enjoy in the civil justice system? The
case involved a question of competing economic interests.
The defendant's side of the dispute in State Farm was
concerned with the interest of multistate corporate
defendants in being free from the risk of large punitive
damage awards used in state tort law to deter (rather than
compensate) wrongdoing.
The plaintiffs side involved the interest of individual
consumers of liability insurance policies (especially those
with low coverage likely to be purchased by relatively nonwealthy natural persons). Policyholders face the economic
problem that insurers often have an incentive to violate
their contractual obligation to appropriately defend the
consumer in liability suits. Low levels of liability coverage
mean a large nationwide insurer often has little money to
lose, and much money to gain in the aggregate, by taking
actions that expose those policyholders to the risk of huge
uncovered economic losses. In State Farm, for instance, the
trial court found that the insurer failed to accept a
reasonable settlement offer that would have avoided the
risk of a high damage award, and gave false information to
the policyholders about their risks and rights. 162 The trial
in that case produced evidence that State Farm's top
management had implemented a nationwide program that
explicitly aimed to "us[e] the claims-adjustment process as
a profit center."'163 This program allegedly involved
systematically and unlawfully denying policyholders their
contractual benefits "in order to meet preset, arbitrary
payout targets designed to enhance corporate profits.' ' 64 If
states enforce contractual obligations by penalizing such
multistate business defendants only enough to compensate
and deter the harm of one of such denial of a consumer's
rights, a multistate business with many similarly situated
consumers may still have an economic incentive to continue

162. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 413-14 (facts presented by the majority
opinion); id. at 435-36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 431 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 431-32 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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the same multistate wrongdoing. In the aggregate, the risk
of loss to the "artificial person" defendant may be very low
compared to the risk of gain (and compared to the risk of
loss to the individual plaintiff).
The problem that Galanter's study raises lies at the
heart of this case: the very status of "artificial personhood"
for large business defendants contributes to particular
systemic substantive problems for civil tort actions by
natural persons. The large multistate (or multinational)
business is legally constituted as a single entity-an
individual "person"-and therefore for legal purposes acts
as a single whole with unified interests, narrowly (though
imperfectly) confined by law to maximizing shareholder
profits. Unlike the typical natural person, subject to
limitations of time, space, mortality, and fluid or conflicting
goals, the artificial business person's actions can normally
include high volumes of small actions occurring in many
jurisdictions at once for an indefinite time aimed at a
relatively clear goal. As a result of its nature as a single
business unit comprised of a large aggregation of interests
and actions, this artificial person's calculations of what
highly
actions are rational will normally be based on 165
aggregated (and narrowly focused) costs and benefits.
The corporation's aggregated nature substantively
affects its calculations of what behavior is reasonable-a
calculation at the core of the tort system's deterrence
principle and at the core of the problems of corporate
advantage Galanter describes. An individual instance of
wrongdoing that would be unreasonable for an actor when
taken in isolation (more costly than beneficial to the actor)
might become reasonable when taken in the aggregate
because of risk-pooling. Actions with a small likelihood of
very high losses at some later point, but with a high
likelihood of small immediate gain, might not appear
rational if those costs and benefits are calculated
individually. But taken in the aggregate, such actions-like
the alleged wrongdoing by the insurer in State Farmmight become more rational because aggregation can
165. Galanter notes empirical data suggesting that jurors award higher
damages to corporations than other parties (even though juries find more
frequently in favor of corporations than other parties) becaues they recognize
"their greater capacity to foresee and prevent harm." Galanter, supra note 1, at
1392.
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facilitate better prediction, mitigation, and spreading of the
risk, while possibly magnifying the benefits of any gain.
In addition, wrongdoing that might be particularly
ineffective or risky when performed by a human individual
might produce more benefits with less risk when engaged in
by large impersonal aggregates where the risk of personal
penalties like imprisonment can be decreased by spreading
the wrongdoing over large numbers of disaggregated actors.
The State Farm trial court heard evidence that the
insurance company systematically stigmatized policyholders who attempted to file insurance claims by attacking
their personal character, and that the company systematically falsified, withheld, and destroyed evidence to deter
wronged policyholders from pursuing legal action. 16 6 If such
wrongdoing is a systematic national practice based on
rational profit maximization rather than an isolated,
individual occurrence based on malevolent actors, plaintiffs
may more likely perceive challenging that wrongdoing as a
low-gain, high-risk proposition. Moreover, large aggregates
are likely to be able to reduce the costs of defending against
claims of wrongdoing by aggregating the costs of legal
services-for instance, by creating and controlling
specialized legal services. 16 7 With enough aggregation, it
may even be possible to reduce legal risks by creating and
influencing specialized judges, specialized laws, specialized
scholars
whose
specialized
legal
legislators,
and
information and interests are shaped to legitimate or
excuse this wrongdoing.
These substantive characteristics of artificial persons
and corporations are not exclusive to that status. Natural
persons can control large aggregations of resources and can
exert control over other actors in differently constituted
aggregate relationships. Nonetheless, these substantive
characteristics of certain artificial persons in the aggregate
can produce incentives for more wrongdoing, and less
accountability, compared to the average natural person.
The Court's decision in State Farm can be understood
as a moment when the question of artificial persons'
disproportionate power comes out of the background of the
civil justice system to be affirmed or reversed as a matter of
166. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 433-35 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
167. See Galanter, supra note 1, at 1380-81.
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substantive policy. The Court in effect decided to
constitutionalize one aspect of this power advantage by
ruling that states have no legitimate reason for tailoring
deterrence measures to address the particularly aggregated
nature of multistate wrongdoing by large business entities.
The Court insisted that any wrongdoing in other states to
other policyholders "bore no relation" to the individual
plaintiffs' harm in State Farm, despite the evidence that the
systematic
wrong resulted from the corporation's
nationwide policy.168 "A defendant's dissimilar acts,
independent from the acts upon which liability was
premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive
damages."'1 69 This reasoning presents the multistate company as a single unit-like a real person-but imagines its
decision making as a process of multiple distinct and
disaggregated actions toward each affected natural
person-as if it were more like a single real person
repeating consecutive actions or a group of real persons
acting separately. Instead, the Court might have recognized
that corporate behavior toward individuals often is (and
apparently was in this case) substantially determined by
governing large numbers
generalized rules simultaneously
70
of similarly situated persons. 1
The Court also explained that the goal of regulating
this specific problem of aggregate wrongdoing of multistate
business was not a legitimate state purpose because state
authority is confined to a single jurisdiction. 17 1 The Court's
image of the defendant again de-emphasized its unified,
integrated nature. The Court disaggregates the decision
making punished by the state into a series of separate
actions in separate jurisdictions each properly addressed by
a separate state. Despite its conclusion that any wrongdoing by the defendants to policyholders nationwide is
unrelated to this case and too hypothetical to merit
consideration, 172 the Court explained that this single state
could not fairly award damages deterring general
168. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422.
169. Id. at 422-23.
170. Id. at 437 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the evidence of outof-state conduct in this case was probative of the in-state wrong).
171. Id. at 421-22.
172. Id. at 422-23.
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wrongdoing without including in that adjudication the
plaintiffs who may have been
potential out-of-state
173
similarly wronged.
If a state can only regulate corporate activity that is
confined to its boundaries on a disaggregated basis, when
the aggregated, multistate perspective of the corporate
decision-making is precisely the cause of the in-state harm
to be regulated, then states will not have the power to
address a substantial problem of wrongdoing occurring
within their states to their citizens. The Court ignores this
state sovereignty problem in favor of the competing concern
174
for out-of-state residents affected by the regulating state.
To support this choice of federalism concerns, the Court
emphasizes the state citizenship rights of out-of-state
plaintiffs who also want to challenge that wrongdoing. It
seems unlikely, however, that a high punitive damage
award based on nationwide wrongdoing would hurt such
plaintiffs' interests. The more obvious interest at issue was
the corporate defendant's desire to avoid having one state
set a punishment based on nationwide wrongdoing that
would encourage litigation in other states, or even that it
would be subjected to multiple and redundant punitive
damage awards for the same conduct-as the Court reasons
later in its opinion. 175 If this corporate interest had been the
example the Court highlighted in its discussion of the state
sovereignty issue, however, its concern would have
appeared weaker.
The artificial nature of the out-of-state multistate
defendant affects the citizenship concerns. Unlike the
natural person in another state, the large nationwide
corporation may have as much of a voice in a foreign
jurisdiction as in its resident jurisdiction, since it cannot
vote as an artificial person, since its residence is nominal,
and since its governing owners and managers may live
anywhere. Moreover, unlike the average natural persons
likely to be harmed by the wrongdoing in this case, the
artificial persons at risk of being subject to multi-state

173. Id. at 421-22.
174. "Any proper adjudication of conduct that occurred outside Utah to
other persons would require their inclusion" and should be decided according to
their own states' laws. Id. at 421-22.
175. Id. at 423.
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adjudications also are likely to have far more power to use
the political process to procure federal regulatory protection
against such a risk, if the risk is a real problem.
In a federal system, wrongdoing driven by multistate
costs and benefits by multistate actors might in theory be
better addressed by federal rather than state governments. 176 But that does not mean constitutional protection
from the political process is the best way to achieve that
goal. By constitutionalizing the corporate interest in being
free from overlapping state authority despite the overlapping multistate nature of its personhood and actions, the
Court helps naturalize corporate power as part of the
structural ground of politics instead of as a substantive
issue contestable within politics.
The Court masks this substantive support for corporate
power by partly casting its ruling as a proceduralprotection
that prohibits punishment without notice and by individual
177
whim or caprice rather than by generalized legal rule.
But the Court's reasoning shows how the privileged position
of artificial persons in the courts is not simply a problem of
Court's general institutional focus on a proceduralism that
substitutes abstract forms and principles for the more
personalized and empathetic judgments familiar to
relationships among natural persons. 178 Instead, the
judicial system's proceduralism has power to selectivelyand systematically-naturalize and personalize certain
interests to encourage empathy not just in the courts but in
judicial
politics and public opinion. The history of the
179
expansion of corporate personhood is an example.
State Farm's majority opinion embellishes that
personhood with sensitivity toward corporate defendants'
artificial dignity (while giving little attention to natural
persons' experiences of harm from the corporate

176. See id. at 422 (discussing the problem as an issue of federalism).
177. See id. at 417-18.
178. See Westbrook, supra note 16 at 1449-50 (attributing corporate power
to legal proceduralism).
179. For another example, see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), where
procedural protections for welfare recipients may have helped identify welfare
recipients to the public as property owners victimized by government
wrongdoing, countering tendencies to see welfare mothers as outside the
mainstream of society.
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wrongdoing at issue).' 80 Rejecting the state's justification
for the punitive damage award as a rational and legitimate
deterrence measure, the Court instead worries that such an
approach might go beyond punishing harmful conduct to
creating a stigmatizing status-"being an unsavory
individual or business." 18 ' The Court supports its scrutiny
of state reasoning about punitive damages by quoting an
earlier case's warning about the danger that 'juries will
'82
use their verdicts to express biases against big business." 1
This reasoning seems to place State Farm in line with
Fourteenth Amendment decisions such as Romer v.
Evans 8 3 and Cleburne Living Center, 8 4 where the Court
subjected state decisions not involving suspect classifications or fundamental rights to unusual scrutiny on the
ground that the state action was based on hostility toward a
particular group. Although those cases involved equal
protection, not due process doctrine, the structural issue is
the same: the Court intervenes to protect persons harmed
by state decision-making when prejudice against a specific
group makes the pluralist political process likely to be
unresponsive to their needs. State Farm's decision that the
danger of prejudice against large corporate defendants in
state courts justifies special federal intervention suggests a
picture strikingly at odds with the facts Galanter describes.
The Court's inverted reasoning not only implies that a
legal system privileging large corporate "APs" over most
natural persons reasonably advances the rule of law. More
disturbingly, it implies that efforts to hold corporations
more accountable to generally applicable legal rules go
beyond legitimate politics to violate the rule of law. State
Farm argued (in part) that the state was driven by

180. The Court notes this harm not by affirmatively describing it, but
simply by acknowledging that "State Farm's handling of the claims against the
Campbells merits no praise." State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419. The Court alludes to
this harm by mentioning that the insurer told the plaintiffs to put a for-sale
sign on their house, but gives no detail on the emotional or other distress the
plaintiffs alleged resulted. Id.
181. Id. at 423.
182. Id. at 417 (quoting Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994)).
183. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
184. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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irrational prejudice or emotional whim 8 5 when it designed
damages to correct a particular problem of corporate power
to evade the law. Regardless of the actual combination of
personal feeling and principled reason that in fact led to the
state's damage award at issue in State Farm, the Court did
not discuss the likelihood that large corporate defendants
might have more power in the current political context than
virtually any other group targeted for political or personal
criticism to use normal politics and ideological debate to
counter any irrational judgments. Instead, in the Court's
logic, opposition to corporate power becomes not simply one
political and ideological view among many to be rationally
debated in a pluralist interest competition, but an irrational
"animus" that must be purged from normal politics and
ideology to protect the system's fundamental unfairness.
State Farm turns the structural reasoning of the
famous Carolene Products footnote four on its head. l8 6 The
State Farm majority intervened in the democratic political
process not to free a "discrete and insular minority" from
systemic political weakness due to subordinated class
185. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418 (expressing concerns that high
punitive damage awards will be based on inflamed "passion or prejudice").
186. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4
(1938) (stating that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."). In an article criticizing
recent Supreme Court interpretations of the Eighth Amendment's protection
against cruel and unusual criminal punishment, Larry Kupers makes a similar
argument that State Farm "has turned . . . that famous footnote on its head."
Larry Kupers, The Woeful Tale of the United States Supreme Court and
for
Large
Disproportionate Punishment-Constitutional Protection
Corporations,Not Human Beings, 62 GUILD PRAC. 12, 22 (2005). Beginning in
1991, a series of Court decisions have repudiated a previously established rule
from
protected
criminal defendants
that the Eighth Amendment
disproportionate punishment. See id. at 13-16 (discussing, for example,
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991)). Many commentators have
contrasted this line of cases rolling back criminal defendants' rights with the
line of cases (also beginning in 1991 and leading to State Farm) that have
created and expanded constitutional protection for corporate tort defendants
from disproportionate punishment. See Kupers, supra, at 16-20; see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 105457 (2004) (noting that the Court has made no attempt to justify this contrasting
doctrine of disproportionate punishment); Pamela S. Karlan, Lecture, "Pricking
the Lines". The Due Process Clause, Punitive Damages, and Criminal
Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880, 904-912 (2004).
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status. Instead, the majority opinion used the Constitution
to protect a class singularly capable of controlling the
political and legal process from political opposition. For this
reason, State Farm's remarkable constitutionalization of
corporate resistance to meaningful accountability for
wrongdoing offers a grim window into the antidemocratic,
antiegalitarian political substance of the current context of
corporate power.
CONCLUSION

This critical picture of the problem of corporate power
suggests it is not a problem simply of form in either
corporations or courts, but instead is a problem of broader
political substance that has institutionalized class-based
inequality in the legal and political system as a whole. By
shifting the view from formal technicalities to systemic
power, critical analysis might make the problem seem more
intractable, rather than more amenable to substantive
change. If both judicial neutrality and majoritarian
democracy are pervasively subject to the corporate power
we might hope they regulate,
then how can any contrary
187
substantive change occur?
Though this corporate power is real, extensive, and
multifaceted, the rationalizations and formal structures
that sustain it are "artificial" in that they are designs of
interested humans negotiated in complex, changing social
and political contexts. But these rationalizations and
structures are also "substantive" in that they reflect not
just generalized principles and problems, but a political and
economic system that has been structured to maintain an
inegalitarian distribution of power. This critical perspective
points to the need for those whose interests and ideals are
harmed by the growth of corporate legal power and
privilege to direct their attention to the structures and
theories that ground that corporate power. It is insufficient
to contest the substantive issues of particular harms to
society from the current economic and legal order-like the
subordination
of workers,
racial
inequality,
the
antidemocratic control of developing nations by interna187. See Westbrook, supra note 16, at 1450 (arguing that more judicial
control of corporations will not be a good strategy for remedying judicial
privileging of corporations).
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tional financial institutions, or the destruction of the
environment.' 8 8 Instead, if the current power imbalance is
unjust, it needs to be confronted at the level of its
underlying form.
The last decade or so has seen burgeoning political
movement organizing around the globe to change the
substance of this form. This movement has been caricatured
and condemned (especially by the corporate controlled
media and corporate funded intellectuals) as an
anachronistic or authoritarian effort to replace "capitalism"
with "communism," or an isolationist, anarchic, or luddite
effort to escape from an interdependent modern global
economy. Though this movement is diverse and includes
many different and openly debated perspectives, a major
strand focuses on reordering local, national, and
transnational institutions to better promote the substance
of democracy and socioeconomic prosperity rather than any
particular formal economic dogma. And many in this
movement target change in formal institutions as a key to
building this democratic order.
In the United States, groups such as the Program on
Corporations, Law & Democracy (POCLAD) and the
National Lawyers Guild are working to re-conceptualize the
corporation not out of preference for state authority over
market competition, or naturalness over artificiality, or
smallness over bigness, but as part of a broader movement
89
for a state and society with different substantive values.
POCLAD, for example, has mobilized labor unions,
environmentalists, and other groups in an effort to
publicize, analyze, and counter substantive changes in state
corporate law that typically get enacted with little debate
as simple technicalities necessary for "modernization." For
188. See Jane Anne Morris, "Help! I've Been Colonized and I Can't Get Up!",
DEFYING CORPORATIONS, DEFINING DEMOCRACY: A BOOK OF HISTORY &
STRATEGY, supranote 87, at 8-12.

in

189. See Natural Lawyers Guild, National Lawyers Guild Resolution, in
DEFYING CORPORATIONS, DEFINING DEMOCRACY: A BOOK OF HISTORY & STRATEGY,

supra note 87, at 252-53 (explaining that Guild's agenda to control corporate
power as part of its historical effort to advance democracy and human rights;
POCLAD, Some Lessons Learned, in DEFYING CORPORATIONS, DEFINING
DEMOCRACY: A BOOK OF HISTORY & STRATEGY, supra note 87, at 294, 296
(explaining POCLAD's strategy to discuss corporate law as part of a broad
examination of property, liberty, and sovereignty by an international coalition
of democratic movements).
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example, a coalition mobilized in Vermont to try to block
legislation eliminating some of the vestiges of the public
control era, asking such questions as: "Why shouldn't states
revoke the charters of harmful corporations? Why shouldn't
employees, shareholders, and corporate neighbors have as
many rights as corporate directors and managers?"'190
Progressive groups organized and mobilized to help defeat
the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), which
would have formalized and substantively increased
multinational corporate power to override national rights
protecting the environment and labor. The continuing
challenges to substantive rules in the World Trade
Organization are an example of how progressive global
organizing has helped to denaturalize and change the
substantive politics driving what corporate interests
presented as tedious technical changes that necessarily
foster global economic growth.
To change the substance of the formal grounds of
corporate power it will also be necessary to analyze and
change the substantive ground rules that structure the
barriers to formalized power facing large organizations (or
potential organizations) of interests often opposed to
corporations, like unions, racial justice groups, or the
impoverished citizens of the Global South. As this Article
has argued, the current system of corporate power is not
the result of inherent features of large interest groups. WalMart, for example, has substantial power to shape labor
and consumer markets to favor cheap labor not simply
because the millions of workers, consumers, and citizens it
employs and sells to form a substantial unified power
block-or because its bigness is inherently alienating or
awe-inspiring to individual workers and local communities.
Instead, the particularly problematic substance of its power
stems from its formal organization in a way that
concentrates control in the hands of a relatively few
wealthy capital owners and managers who can employ
formal legal rules (governing unionization and trade, for
instance) to protect their interests from the potentially huge
organized power of workers, small businesses, and local
communities.
190. See Richard L. Grossman, The Corporate Crunch in Vermont, in
DEFYING CORPORATIONS, DEFINING DEMOCRACY: A BOOK OF HISTORY & STRATEGY,

supra note 87, at 116.
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Contemporary procedural rules often make some
organized generalized interests other than corporate profitmaximization, like the general interest in promoting racial
equality, too abstract and insubstantial to permit
systematic legal mobilization. 19' Labor laws restricting
secondary boycotts by unions are another example of how
labor interests face restrictions on forming and asserting
power on a large scale capable of counterbalancing
corporate power.' 92 Or, for another example that Galanter
notes, tax laws give public financial support for formal legal
but not for
advocacy by organized commercial interests
93
groups organized to advance other interests.
The critical insight that form is substance offers both
caution and promise for those concerned about the situation
that Galanter describes-a legal system skewed to advance
corporate power against unorganized natural persons. The
caution is that no formal protections can guarantee
substantive results: the surface neutrality of the courts,
state, and economy is saturated with unequal power. The
promise is that this substantive power is not a natural force
out of human control, but an artifice that depends on a
complex system of myriad formal and institutional rules
that indirectly and imperfectly uphold that power and that
indirectly, and gradually could be reformed to shift that
power. The capacity of a modern global political economy to
empower large formal organizations includes the capacity
to formalize and organize a different substantive politics
and morality that does a better job of systematically
responding to and advancing the interests of most of the
world's natural persons.

191. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
192. See James Atleson, The Voyage of the Neptune Jade: The Perils and
Promisesof TransnationalLabor Solidarity,52 BUFF. L. REV. 85 (2004) (arguing
that cross-national collective action for and by workers is increasingly necessary
to their economic interests and basic human rights, but that such action is often
unlawful).
193. See Galanter, supra note 1, at 1392.

